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Abstract:  
Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary 
in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state 
entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political 
injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he 
calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the 
War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the aggressive side to 
use military violence against soldiers defending the victim state. Non-state actors, in 
contrast, have to fulfill more stringent requirements. If they do not, then even their attacks 
on military personnel can properly be called terrorist. In the following I will argue that 
Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the legitimate authority criterion of just war 
theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence has to satisfy heavier burdens of 
justification than state violence fails for a number of reasons: his claim that defenders 
would wrong victims if they defended them against their will is mistaken, he overlooks 
the fact that non-state agents need not claim to fight on someone’s behalf, the full moral 
authority he mentions is redundant, the powers he ascribes to “Lesser Moral Authority” 
are, depending on interpretation, either morally irrelevant or nonexistent, and his claim 
that granting states “Lesser Moral Authority” is beneficial from a “moral pragmatic” 
point of view while granting the same authority to non-state actors is not, is unwarranted. 
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Introduction 
Christopher J. Finlay argues “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary 
in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state 
entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political 
injustice.” (288)1 This formulation immediately raises two questions: given that Finlay 
only mentions non-state entities making certain claims, does he mean to imply a) that a 
principle of legitimate authority is not necessary for evaluating the justifiability of 
violence by states? This would indeed be a noteworthy – and curious – difference 
between the moral status of states on the one hand and of non-state entities on the other. 
Moreover, does he mean to imply that the principle of legitimate authority is not 
necessary for evaluating the justifiability of the violence of non-state actors who do not 
claim to act on behalf of others but simply act on behalf of themselves? If he does not 
mean to imply this latter proposition, but in fact means to deny it, it should be noted 
                                                
1 Christopher J. Finlay, “Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 18(3) (2010): 287-312, page numbers in parentheses refer to this 
text. 
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already here that he has not provided an argument in support of such a denial (indeed, he 
does not explicitly address the issue). 
Finlay divides his study into three parts. In the first part he focuses on individuals 
rather than communities and evaluates “the relevance of victim autonomy to determining 
the limits of legitimate acts of defensive assistance by third parties.” (288) In the second 
part he focuses on communities instead, and argues “that for non-state entities to be able 
to characterize the killing of military personnel as attacks on ‘combatants’ they have a 
heavier burden of justification than is conventionally and legally demanded of sovereign 
states.” (288) However, it is not entirely clear why he wants to argue that. To wit, why 
should the justifiability of the violence of non-state groups depend on such a belligerent’s 
ability to “characterize the killing of military personnel as attacks on ‘combatants’”? Why 
should a non-state entity not simply characterize its attacks as attacks on people who 
culpably engage in or contribute to severe rights violations? And isn’t the truth of a moral 
proposition more important than how things are being “characterized”? 
Anyway, in the third section Finlay argues “that representative legitimacy and 
consultative input are typically vital to the authorization of non-state entities and hence to 
their ability to invoke the targeting rights characteristic of war. In some cases, failure to 
fulfill these requirements will mean that attacks launched even on military personnel can 
properly be adjudged ‘terrorist’ on the ‘orthodox’ definition.” (288-289) 
In the following I will argue that Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the 
legitimate authority criterion of just war theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence 
has to satisfy heavier burdens of justification than state violence fails. 
 
1. The Individualist Perspective 
Finlay claims “that the victims of aggression might sometimes claim a right to refuse 
assistance.” (290) With the qualifier “sometimes” he refers to “situations in which the 
victim is in a position to make an informed choice and to communicate it to a would-be 
defender.” (292-293, emphasis removed) And his conclusion is that: 
the absence of consent or the presence of strong objections by the victim of 
aggression means that defensive actions taken on their behalf will be less justified. 
Whether the objections of the victim entirely negate the justification, however, 
depends on the meta-ethical frame we adopt. … Third parties, on this view, who 
proceed with a violent intervention in the face of a refusal of authorization lack 
legitimacy in relation to … the victim of aggression and putative beneficiary of 
defensive actions ... Thus, even though their use of force may not do any wrong to 
the aggressor, it might constitute an injustice to its supposed beneficiary. (294) 
Finlay’s only argument for this conclusion seems to be the claim that “on the basis of 
human dignity and the victims’ prima facie entitlement to be involved in important moral 
decisions taken in the name of their rights” (296) “third parties might sometimes be 
obliged to value—or at least to consider valuing—a victim’s autonomous choice over 
their right to life even when faced with probable death” (293). 
This argument, however, is flawed. First of all, one needs to distinguish between a 
person’s autonomy over her life and a person’s autonomy over her right to life. A third 
party who defends a victim who does not want to be defended violates neither. To wit, 
the defender does not keep the victim from disposing of her life. If the victim wants to 
commit suicide, she is free to do so. In fact, the defender is not interfering with the victim 
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at all, she interferes solely with the aggressor. Therefore it is unclear how the defender 
can violate her autonomy. Accordingly, the defender is most certainly not interfering with 
the victim’s right to life: the victim can waive or relinquish her right to life, her right 
against aggression, and her right of self-defense anytime. The defender is not keeping her 
from doing this at all. Moreover, the state could express its respect for this autonomy of 
the victim later on: if the victim had validly waived or relinquished her right against 
aggression, and the aggressor succeeded in killing the victim, then the state, out of respect 
for the victim’s autonomy, should refuse to admit any later attempt by the victim’s 
relatives to bring a wrongful death suit against the aggressor. The state should say: “We 
respect the victim’s autonomy. The victim waived her right against aggression. Therefore 
the aggressor did not violate any rights of the victim, and you therefore cannot sue him.” 
In fact, if anybody’s autonomy is being violated by a demand not to attack an 
aggressor, it is the defender’s autonomy. If the victim does not want to attack the 
defender, fine, but that does not give the victim a right against the defender that he not 
interfere with the attacker. Of course, Finlay thinks there is such a right on the part of the 
victim (at least in those situations where the victim is capable of autonomous choice): as 
we just saw, he states that the use of force by the defender against the aggressor “might 
constitute an injustice to its supposed beneficiary.” However, so far Finlay has not 
provided a convincing argument for this view. 
Moreover, according to the law in many European jurisdictions, an attack is any 
rights-violation (that is, any injustice) stemming from human action – and people have a 
right to defend themselves against attacks. This is also the correct stance to take from a 
moral point of view: persons not only have a right to defend themselves against violence 
directed against their bodily integrity, they have a right to defend themselves against all 
kinds of right violations. Without such a right, all other rights would not be worth very 
much. 
But then, it seems, Finlay’s view would imply that the victim who has refused 
assistance has a right to attack the defender who is attacking the aggressor. He could even 
enlist others to help him defending his rights against the defender. This, I submit, is 
extremely counter-intuitive. In fact, it would seem that if the victim tried, for instance, to 
taser the defender in order to keep him from attacking the aggressor, the defender would 
thereby acquire a right of self-defense against the victim (turned aggressor), too. This 
speaks against the victim having the right against the defender that the latter not attack 
the aggressor. 
Finally, let me say something about intuitions. Finlay states that it is “counter-
intuitive” to claim that “any suitably positioned individual or group could claim rights of 
violent assistance on behalf of the individual members of a community that was suffering 
violence, say from the state or another community” and that “[n]o consultation with the 
victims would be required as the duty to assist occurs independently of the defensive 
rights of the victim.” (290) I, in contrast, find it enormously intuitive to claim that any 
suitably situated group has a right to defend potential victims from aggressors, whether 
the victims like it or not. I believe, with thinkers as different as Kant and Locke, that 
persons have a fundamental – that is, underived – natural right to attack aggressors.2 (Of 
                                                
2 See Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), esp. pp. 45-50. 
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course, such rights can be overridden by countervailing considerations: if the exercise of 
the right would lead to some very bad effects, then the agent might be prohibited from 
exercising the right. German legal scholarship calls the exercise of a right under such 
circumstances “rights abuse.” Rights abuse is, as it were, the mirror image of a necessity 
justification: the necessity justification permits one to override other people’s rights 
because this would be the lesser evil under the circumstances, the rights abuse proviso 
prohibits one from exercising one’s own right because this would incur too great an evil 
under the circumstances.) Consider now the following example: A group of Swedish 
pacifists who have publicly and to everybody’s knowledge waived their rights to life, 
absolved non-pacifists from any special duties towards them, and enjoined all people 
from abstaining from helping them against aggressors have a convention on some 
meadow. A group of police officers are watching the scene because some Swedish 
militarists have made credible death threats against the pacifists. And, indeed, the 
militarists appear on the scene, draw their machine pistols, and start mowing the pacifists 
down. The police interfere, forcibly stopping the aggressors. 
Did the police violate the rights of the pacifists by attacking and stopping the 
aggressors? It does not appear so.3 In fact, if the pacifists disabled the weapons of the 
police with their remote non-violent police weapons deactivator, they could be arrested 
and imprisoned for obstruction of justice, and it seems that this is not only legally, but 
also morally fair. Moreover, to claim that the police were not justified in attacking the 
aggressors seems to be not only counter-intuitive but downright absurd. 
Now, it might appear that Finlay has a reply to this objection. Finlay states that there 
are “types of relationships … where the responsibility of the third party defending is such 
that it overrides the autonomy of the victim” (292) as in the case where a mother defends 
her daughter without the daughter’s consent. And although Finlay is of the opinion that 
such a relationship does not ordinarily occur “between two adults with full moral 
competence” (292), he could nevertheless claim that the situation with the police is 
extraordinary and that the police – a state-agent – have certain special responsibilities. 
Yet, note that given how I constructed the pacifist/militarist example these special duties 
cannot be duties towards the pacifists – after all, the pacifists have absolved all non-
pacifists from all special duties towards them. Admittedly, however, the police might still 
have special duties with regard to them. To wit, if you and I are sitting in a café and you 
ask me to watch your belongings while you go to the bathroom, and I accept your 
request, then it is not your belongings that acquire a claim right against me to watch them 
– you are the one who has a claim right against me that I watch your belongings, and you 
acquired it by me making a promise to you. 
Likewise, police officers might acquire a special obligation to protect others from 
harm by some kind of tacit agreement, or more ordinarily, by signing a contract and 
making a solemn oath. However, nothing hinders non-state actors from signing contracts 
                                                
3 It has been suggested to me that a mother who has been attacked by her child and who 
asked not to be defended against him would be wronged if someone defended her 
anyway. I find this entirely implausible, especially if the child is a 30 year old culpable 
aggressor. I would also like to know if the mother would be wronged if the state decided 
to punish the aggressor later on – against the will of the mother. If not – what is supposed 
to be the difference? 
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or making solemn oaths to defend the rights of the downtrodden, whether those 
downtrodden want to be defended or not. There simply is no difference here between 
state actors and non-state actors; at least Finlay has not yet demonstrated that there is. 
Moreover, his arguments from autonomy have, as we saw, failed to establish that 
defensive actions taken on the behalf of the victim are “less justified” if the victim objects 
to such defensive actions. There is no reason to assume that persons lack a fundamental 
right to attack aggressors; and persons do not need a victim’s consent to exercise this 
right.  
 
2. The Group Perspective 
In the second section of his paper Finlay, as already stated, wants 
to show how a principle of moral authority is needed in order to ground the 
distinction between justifiable violence by non-state political entities and 
unjustified criminal violence, and, second, to argue that entities of this kind 
typically have to fulfil a more demanding moral authority requirement than states 
do in the current international order. (297) 
This passage seems to contain the implicit assumption that there can be no justified 
criminal violence. This is also suggested by Finlay’s bank robber example, where armed 
robbers are facing the security forces and, according to Finlay, the latter acquire a 
permission to target the former, but not vice versa. But of course the reply is: that 
depends. If the Nazis legally disappropriate and then kill a Jewish gallerist and put his 
most famous picture in the vault of their Nazi bank which is protected by Nazi security 
guards, and in 1943 a group of Jewish bank robbers unrelated to the gallerist break in to 
steal the picture in order to sell it and to live a life in luxury in Brazil (their motive is 
personal gain), then it seems to me entirely justified for them to shoot down the Nazi 
security guards. We are dealing with a case of justified criminal violence here. Moreover, 
nothing changes – whether we are talking about a Nazi bank or not – if the bank robbers 
are state-agents, for example secret service men from another country. In any case, it is 
not a “principle of moral authority” that is “needed in order to ground the distinction 
between justifiable violence by non-state political entities and unjustified criminal 
violence.” Instead, what is needed are the right distinctions to begin with. To wit, there is 
the distinction between criminal violence and non-criminal violence. To make this 
distinction we need the concept of the law: criminal violence breaks the law, non-
criminal violence does not. Furthermore, there is the distinction between political 
violence and non-political violence. To make this distinction we need a concept of the 
political. And third, we need a distinction between morally justified violence and morally 
unjustified violence. For this distinction we need a concept of morality. These 
distinctions do not neatly map onto each other: there is morally unjustified legal political 
violence, and there is morally justified criminal non-political violence, and there is, of 
course, also criminal, that is illegal, political violence. Perhaps Finlay means by criminal 
violence violence that does not also aim at a political goal. But, of course, there is also 
both justified and unjustified criminal violence in this sense. 
But let us move on. Following Jeff McMahan, Finlay distinguishes a “‘deep moral’ 
point of view” from a “morally pragmatic” perspective regarding war (302). And while 
he believes that it is “necessary to accept the force of revisionist arguments that just 
warriors aren’t usually liable to the use of force from a deeper moral perspective” (300) 
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he has great sympathies for what he calls “[c]onventionalist approaches” (298), 
explaining that “there is a morally pragmatic case for maintaining moral equality as a 
principle governing the conduct of hostilities between states.” (302) This “morally 
pragmatic” case is that upholding this principle makes war less destructive and reduces 
the number of rights-violations. Allegedly, however, applying this principle to non-state 
actors as well would not have the same beneficial effects. 
I will return to this latter point in a moment. For now, however, the question is what 
all this is supposed to have to do with “legitimate authority.” Finlay argues “that a link is 
silently made between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum on Conventionalist views, 
grounding the non-immunity of combatants, one that rests on a particular notion of moral 
authority.” (300) He explains this further in the following important passage, which I 
quote at length: 
On Conventionalist accounts of just war theory … the initiation of hostilities by an 
aggressor state does entail some adjustment in the distribution of individual rights. 
In particular, it entitles individual soldiers on the aggressive side to use military 
violence against soldiers defending the victim state. This is the major import of the 
doctrine of moral equality. Despite the fact that it isn’t entitled to declare the war it 
has initiated, once it has done so, the aggressor state is implicitly entitled to invoke 
the terms of the War Convention, that is, to create a State of War and bring to bear 
the rules governing such a condition, the jus in bello. States, therefore, appear to 
have two forms of moral authority: first, the moral right to declare a just war justly 
(i.e. when the other terms of the jus ad bellum are fulfilled); second, the purely 
conventional ability to create a State of War even, apparently, in the absence of a 
just cause or despite a failure to fulfil the other terms of the jus ad bellum. Moral 
authority in this latter sense—which I’ll call ‘Lesser Moral Authority’—thus 
appears as an intermediate right: it arises implicitly in relation to the jus in bello but 
is also relevant to the jus ad bellum (and thus connects the two, despite common 
pronouncements to the contrary). (301) 
Note that in the first sense of “moral authority” having moral authority just means 
having jus ad bellum. Moral authority in this sense has absolutely no independent role to 
play and is therefore entirely redundant. The important question, however, is what the 
invocation of the “State of War” is supposed to do. Unfortunately, Finlay is anything but 
explicit and clear on this point, so I need to speculate a bit. Remember that Finlay states 
that it is “necessary to accept the force of revisionist arguments that just warriors aren’t 
usually liable to the use of force from a deeper moral perspective while upholding the 
principle of moral equality as a convention on morally pragmatic grounds.” (300) I think 
this talk about a “deeper moral perspective” and “upholding the principle of moral 
equality as a convention” obscures things more than it illuminates them. What might be 
meant, however, is Hugo Grotius’s 400-year-old thought – and since this thought is so 
old there is nothing particularly revisionist about it – that the soldiers on the justified and 
on the unjustified of a war are not moral equals but that the latter should nevertheless 
enjoy legal impunity (which is different from upholding the principle of moral equality) 
for their participation in an unjustified war, that is, they should not be punished (as 
opposed to being killed in combat) for their participation.4 Again, the pragmatic reasons 
                                                
4 See Uwe Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal 
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for this is that this would, allegedly, reduce the destructiveness of the war.  
Now, if this is all that Finlay means, namely that thanks to the laws of armed conflict 
or to “the” mysterious war convention5 state soldiers are not legally or conventionally 
punishable for their participation in an unjustified war, then Finlay’s entire discussion 
misses the moral question, and the “Lesser Moral Authority” is no moral authority at all. 
After all, the fact that some militant is punishable under some law or convention while 
his opponent is not implies pretty much nothing about the moral standing of the two 
enemies. For instance, it does not imply that the former is morally liable to force while 
the latter is not, nor does it imply that the latter’s use of force is morally justified while 
the former’s isn’t, nor that the latter’s use of force is less objectionable than the former’s. 
 But perhaps Finlay means more. Perhaps the “adjustment in the distribution of 
individual rights” he mentions is not only an adjustment of legal rights, but of moral ones. 
Now, this interpretation seems to conflict with his statement that “[s]oldiers at war, … 
suffer a prescription of their ordinary human rights; they lose ordinary legal rights, not 
through actions entailing forfeiture, but as a result of political or legal decisions by 
states.” (300) This passage suggests that he understands human rights as legal rights here. 
But, again, telling us that the armed forces of states on the one hand and certain non-state 
forces on the other have a different legal standing tells us nothing yet about their moral 
standing. Yet in this very same statement Finlay uses Simmons’s term “prescription,” and 
Simmons is discussing moral rights.6 Thus, to repeat the question, might Finlay indeed 
ultimately entertain the idea that thanks to their “Lesser Moral Authority” states have the 
remarkable power of changing the moral standing of militants and civilians simply by 
invoking “the War Convention”? Can states make people liable to attack simply by 
“denominating” them “enemy combatants” (296)? 
It would not appear so. Elsewhere, Finlay states that “by putting [just warriors] 
forward and designating them ‘legitimate targets’ the state actively aids and abets in their 
killing.”7 He goes on to explain: “My point … is that it is the distribution of legal 
liabilities to (morally unjust) harm under the LOAC in such cases that is ‘not unjust’ 
rather than the unjust warriors’ attempts to kill just warriors. Under such a distributive 
scheme, truly voluntary just warriors would still suffer moral injustice when attacked by 
their enemies even if they suffered none from their own side.”8 Thus, it seems that the 
redistribution of legal or conventional rights does not have any effect on the moral rights 
of militants – and, of course, this was to be expected all along. 
However, sometimes one can justifiably override the rights of others, typically on 
grounds of a necessity justification, and in a footnote, Finlay states that from “a deeper 
                                                                                                                                            
of Ethics 13 (2012), pp. 339-366, section 2. 
5 I say that the talk about “the war convention” is mysterious, because there is not one 
war convention, but rather different conventions; some are accepted by some people or 
organizations, others by others, and there is really no reason to assume that non-state 
organizations should be bound by the conventions that states find convenient. 
6 A. John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 48. 
7 Christopher J. Finlay, “Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-
combatants and Lawful Irregulars,” Political Studies 61 (2013), 142-160, at 147. 
8 Ibid., p. 148. 
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moral perspective, the killing of a soldier in an unjust war who has done nothing to make 
himself liable to a forfeiture of rights is equally objectionable whether he is attacked by 
members of a non-state group or a legally recognized army.” (312, n. 58) Is this meant to 
suggest that from a less deep, more, I suppose, superficial perspective it is more 
objectionable, and indeed more morally objectionable? But how can the redistribution of 
legal rights or the existence of a legal permission to kill certain people make killing them 
less objectionably morally? 
Consider the following example. A certain state suffers from a lot of inter-ethnic 
violence. The wise state leader’s sociologists have found out, however, that designating a 
certain ethnic group, let’s say the Roma, legally and conventionally legitimate targets and 
allowing every ethnic group to designate their own legally and conventionally legitimate 
Roma killers will dramatically reduce the overall violence in the state since ethnic groups 
(apart from the Roma) would now direct their resources to Roma killing and this common 
goal would unite the other ethnic groups. The wise state leader knows that the rights of 
the Roma will still be violated “from a deeper moral perspective,” but from a “morally 
pragmatic” perspective “the Genocide Convention” –  that is, the new laws and practices 
of designating legitimate targets of inter-ethnic violence and legitimate agents to engage 
in such violence –  is very useful and beneficial overall. In fact, after all the Roma are 
killed off, this state becomes a shining international example of multicultural peace. Now, 
do we really want to say that a designated Roma killer’s killing of innocent Roma is less 
objectionable then a free-lance Roma killer’s killing of innocent Roma? I doubt it. There 
is simply no good reason to assume that a legally designated combatant’s – that is, a 
legally designated killer’s – killing of innocent people is morally less objectionable than a 
non-designated killer’s killing of innocent people. At the very least, Finlay has not 
offered us any reason to think otherwise. 
Therefore, Finlay also lacks any justification for his claim that attacks on morally 
innocent legal or conventional combatants by agents who do not themselves have a legal 
or conventional “right to denominate enemy ‘combatants’,” that is, a right to invoke a 
“State of War” (or a “State of Genocide” for that matter) are terrorist while attacks on 
innocents by agents who did invoke such a “State of War” are not (311-312). It seems 
that Finlay is simply applying a double standard here. 
This is, in my view, also evident if we consider an issue that I promised above to 
return to: Finlay claims that upholding the principle of moral equality makes war less 
destructive and reduces the number of rights-violations, but that applying this same 
principle to non-state actors as well would not have the same beneficial effects. But why 
is that? Finlay has two answers. First, “while the ability to invoke the jus in bello might 
encourage discrimination in favor of civilians by non-state actors, it would also give any 
individual or gang with political motives, however spurious, a blanket moral endorsement 
for ‘cop-killing,’ as Robert Goodin calls it, that is, carte blanche to kill soldiers and 
armed police with impunity (subject to defensive force).” (303) Actually, however, under 
jus in bello regular police officers are not legitimate targets at all, and therefore the cop-
killing argument is spurious: invoking jus in bello would give non-state actors only the 
ability to legally target members of the armed forces (or people who “participate in 
hostilities”). That, however, is not any different with states. Thus, one can reply to 
Finlay: while the ability to invoke the jus in bello might encourage discrimination in 
favor of civilians by state actors, it would also give any individual state or gang of states 
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with political motives, however spurious (after all, they might just want to have another 
country’s oil: is that “political”?) a carte blanche to kill soldiers with impunity (subject to 
defensive force). Finlay’s second answer is that “if arrested, individuals with a claim to 
political status as members of non-state entities would have to be treated as prisoners of 
war while their ‘war’ persisted and they would have to be released if their organization 
came to terms of peace with its enemy.” (303) But again, the obvious reply is: if arrested, 
individuals with a claim to political status as members of state entities would have to be 
treated as prisoners of war while their ‘war’ persisted and they would have to be released 
if their organization came to terms of peace with its enemy (which is, of course, precisely 
the current arrangement under international law). Thus, instead of showing that there is 
indeed a morally relevant difference between state and non-state actors as far as the moral 
utility of allowing them “to invoke the jus in bello” is concerned, Finlay simply ignores 
the fact that his arguments against giving non-state actors such a power apply equally to 
states. 
 
Conclusion 
I conclude that Finlay has failed to show “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority 
is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by 
non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and 
political injustice.” (288) Even if he had shown this, however, he would not have shown 
that legitimate authority is necessary for an entity’s legitimately declaring or waging war, 
since non-state entities need not claim to act on behalf of others; they can simply act on 
their own behalf, defending their own rights or the moral or legal order. They need not 
“represent” anybody.9 Moreover, Finlay even admits himself that a non-state actor can 
have full moral authority if it has jus ad bellum (304), and the same would then also be 
true of states. Yet, as I pointed out above, this makes legitimate authority redundant and 
therefore unnecessary. Finlay also fails to demonstrate that non-state actors have to 
shoulder a heavier burden of moral justification than states in order to justify their 
violence. In fact, Finlay’s discussion of legal and conventional issues simply misses this 
moral issue, and while he thinks that there might be relevant connections between these 
legal and conventional issues on the one hand and the moral ones on the other, he has 
failed to establish such a connection. Therefore, finally, his claim that attacks on morally 
innocent legal or conventional combatants by agents who do not themselves have a legal 
or conventional “right to denominate enemy ‘combatants’” are terrorist while attacks on 
innocents by agents who did invoke such a “State of War” are not terrorist seems to be 
simply the expression of a pro-state bias. 
                                                
9 See on this also Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), ch. 1. Finlay claims that I “dismiss the importance of legitimate 
authority in deciding on the moral questions arising from non-state political violence” 
(288), but I do not “dismiss” it so much as provide a sustained argument against it. Finlay 
also notes that A. J. Coates’s “approach seems to point towards an account like the one 
[Finlay is] seeking though” (311, n. 57). Coates was one of my main targets in the chapter 
mentioned, but Finlay does not engage my arguments against the importance of 
representation and legitimate authority in detail. 
 
